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INTERNATIONAL LAW: HICKENLOOPER
AMENDMENT HELD APPLICABLE TO
PROPERTY CONFISCATED BY A FOREIGN
NATION ONLY IF PROPERTY MARKETED IN
THE UNITED STATES
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank' the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Hickenlooper
Amendment 2 requires a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over a
suit only when the claim involves identifiable expropriated property
which the confiscating nation attempts to market in the United
States. First National City is the most recent in a series of suits
arising out of the nationalization of American property in Cuba by
the Castro government.3 First National City Bank made a fifteen-
million dollar loan, secured by collateral held in New York, to a
corporate agency of the Cuban Government in 1958. After accession
to control by the Castro government on January 1, 1959, the loan was
renewed, and Banco Nacional succeeded to the obligations of the
original borrower. After repayment of one-third of the loan and the
return of an equal portion of the collateral, the Cuban Government
nationalized eleven First National City offices in Cuba in September,
1960. First National City retaliated by selling the collateral securing
the ten-million dollar balance on the loan for an amount considerably
greater than the .principal due plus interest;' the excess was to be
applied as a setoff against the loss occasioned by the confiscation of
the property. Banco Nacional sued to recover the excess from the
sales, 5 and First National City counterclaimed for the same amount
on the grounds that Cuba's confiscation constituted a violation of
international law. The district court held that the defendant was
entitled to a setoff for any amount due and owing to it from the
1. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated, 39 U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1971).
2. Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 § 301(d)(2), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (Supp. V, 1970),
amending Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 § 301(d)(4), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1964).
3. See Cuban Power Resolution no. 2, reproduced in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First
National City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1009-10 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
4. The district court set the excess at $1,810,880. 270 F. Supp. at 1006. There is some dispute
as to the amount in the court of appeals. 431 F.2d at 395.
5. A second cause of action for recovery of Banco Nacional's deposits with First National
was dismissed on First National City's motion for summary judgment and is not at issue here.
270 F. Supp. at 1011.
1248
HICKENLOOPER AMENDMENT
Cuban Government as a result of the confiscation of First National
City's Cuban properties. The court of appeals reversed, ordering
summary judgment for Banco Nacional.6
The act of state doctrine precludes courts of one nation from
passing upon the validity of the actions of foreign states performed
within their own territories in their sovereign capacity. 7 Although not
a rigid requirement of either international or Constitutional law,8 the
Supreme Court has found its vitality to depend upon the necessity of
maintaining the proper distribution of control over foreign affairs
between the judicial and political branches of government.? In Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,10 where this doctrine was applied to
Cuban property expropriations, the Court held that
[t]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign government ... in the absence of a treaty
or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if
the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law."
That suit arose when an American commodity broker contracted with
the Cuban subsidiary of an American-owned producer for the
purchase of a shipload of sugar. The Castro government expropriated
the cargo, and the broker entered into identical contracts to purchase
the same sugar from an agent of the Cuban Government. The broker
obtained the bills of lading without making payment, whereupon
claim was made for the funds on behalf of the American-owned
producer. Banco Nacional's subsequent suit against the broker for
conversion was dismissed by both the district 2 and circuit courts.' 3
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that the act of state
doctrine precludes any challenge to the Cuban expropriation, thus
6. The excess proceeds were not remitted to the Cuban bank but rather became a blocked
Cuban asset according to the terms of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 5
(1964).
7. See generally H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMu NITY 387-90 (1933).
8. "IT]he act of state doctrine is a principle of decision binding on federal and state courts
alike but compelled by neither international law nor the Constitution." Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,427 (1963). The doctrine, as noted by the Court in Sabbatino,
stems from seventeenth century English precedent, Blad v. Bamfield, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch.
1674) and emerged early in American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 293 (1808); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199 (1796).
9. 376 U.S. at 427-28.
10. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
II. Id. at 428.
12. 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
13. 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
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nullifying as a defense the alleged illegality of the Cuban action. There
was an immediate and most audible reaction from those who
witnessed the Court close judicial channels of redress to innocent
victims of Castro's international indiscretion.
Within a month, Senator Hickenlooper offered an amendment to
the pending foreign aid bill" designed to reverse the Sabbatino
decision; a rewritten version was enacted as part of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1964,15 and a slight but crucial modification was
made thereto in the following year." The Amendment directed that no
United States court should decline on the basis of the act of state
doctrine to hear a case in which a property claim is based upon a
confiscation by a foreign state in violation of international law." The
Congress, smarting from a decision which it viewed as an open
invitation to thievery by future Castros, thus hoped to assure the
individual victim his "day in court." In Senator Hickenlooper's
words
[t]he Amendment is designed to discourage uncompensated expropriation of
foreign investment by preserving the right of the original owners to attack any
taking in violation of international law if the property involved comes before a
U.S. Court. . . . [T]he knowledge that this market will be denied to stolen
property should discourage seizure of that investment."8
14. S. REP. No. 1188, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1964).
15. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1964).
16. Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, § 301(d)(2), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (Supp.
V, 1970). See note 17 infra.
17. The Amendment in its present form provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall decline
on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits
giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or
other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party
claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other
taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the principles of
international law, including the principles of compensation and the other standards set
out in this subsection. . . . Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 § 301(d)(2), codified at 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (Supp. V, 1970) (emphasis added).
The broader version of the 1964 Amendment covered cases where a "claim of title or other
right" was asserted. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1964). The words "to property" were added in
1965. The addition made explicit what was obviously the original intent of its sponsors; both
Congressman Adair, 110 CONG. REc. 23680 (1964), and Senator Hickenlooper, 110 CONO,
REc. 24076-77 (1964), had expressly voiced their desire to limit the act to expropriated property
later marketed in the United States. The extensive hearings in 1965 made this abundantly clear.
See Hearings on H.R. 7750 Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong., Ist
Sess. 578 et seq. (1965) and Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the
Foreign Assistance Program, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 728 et seq. (1965).
18. 110 CONG. REc. 19557 (1964).
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The legislatively-intended reversal of Sabbatino followed shortly after
the Amendment's enactment. On rehearing the case, now Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Farr,1' the district court, after allowing sixty
days for the Executive to intervene, held the Hickenlooper
Amendment constitutional under the Commerce Clause and exercised
its newly-established jurisdictional "reversal of presumptions",* by
dismissing the Cuban claim for the proceeds of the expropriated
sugar. 21 This apparent intention to limit the Amendment's coverage to
property which had been seized and which later appeared on the
American market was discussed in French v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba." The claimant brought suit on Cuban-issued certificates of tax
exemption for which he was prevented by Cuban regulation from
receiving currency other than Cuban pesos. In dismissing the
complaint, the court held that the intended scope of the Amendment
was limited to "specific and identifiable and 'traceable' property."' 3
Relying heavily upon the legislative history of the Amendment,s
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in First National City held that
the lower court significantly expanded the allowable scope of federal
court jurisdiction over expropriated property claims by overreading
the vague terminology' delineating the type of claim covered. 25 Since'
the property at issue was not and had never been "confiscated
property," the Second Circuit reasoned that the case was not within
the intended bounds of the Hickenlooper Amendment. The court
found further support for its narrow interpretation in the legislative
policy underlying two other bills prompted by the Cuban
expropriations. Through an amendment to Subchapter V of the
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949,26 Congress provided
that the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission should ascertain the
amount and validity of claims against Cuba resulting from
nationalization. Thus the proper determination of First National
19. 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 956 (1968).
20. 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3852.
21. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 272 F. Supp. 836, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
22. 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704,295 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968).
23. Id. at 61,242 N.E.2d at 714,295 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
24. 431 F.2d at 399-402. In support of its interpretation, the court cited the views of the
Amendment's House sponsor, Congressman Adair, 110 CONG. REc. 23680 (1964); of Professor
Olmstead, Hearings on H.R. 7750 Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 578 (1965); and of then Attorney General Katzenbach, id. at 1235-37.
25. 431 F.2d at 402.
26. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1643-1643k (Supp. V, 1970).
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City's claim, according to the court, lay with the Commission and not
the federal courts. The court of appeals also noted that, pursuant to
the Trading with the Enemy Act,2 the President had blocked all
Cuban assets within the United States.28 First National City would
bypass this system of claims settlement2' if allowed to retain the excess
proceeds rather than submit them to the settlement fund for
distribution to all claimants.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, by refusing
to sanction an expansion of the Hickenlooper Amendment to provide
a "self-held seizure remedy" for those few American claimants with
access to assets of a foreign nation at the time of nationalization of
American property,31 restores validity to an important international
doctrine. Coupled with the results in the French case,31 where a
contractual right was held not to be "property" covered by the
Amendment, it has been suggested that the act of state doctrine will be
restored by confining the scope of the Amendment by judicial
interpretation of its ambivalent wording.3 The First National City
decision by reversing the district court avoided the very delicate
question of whether the Hickenlooper Amendment did, in effect,
create a new federal remedy for private investors to recover damages
for confiscated property when all aspects of the transaction took place
in a foreign state and should therefore be governed by that state's
law.? The decision thus relieves somewhat the pressures exerted by the
legislatively-mandated intrusion of the judicial branch on the
delicately balanced international situation in which the President
must operate. The Amendment attempted to avoid the pitfalls of
judicial incursion in this area by allowing the President to intervene in
those suits vital to the conduct of foreign affairs. However, this
safeguard is illusory; rarely will the President intervene to deprive an
27. 50 U.S.C. App. § 5 (1964). The court noted as well, however, that there is no present
provision for vested blocked assets in the United States for the satisfaction of claims. See 431
F.2d at 403, n.16.
28. Embargo on All Trade with Cuba, Proc. No. 3447 (Feb. 3, 1962), 3 C.F.R. §§ 157-58
(1959-63 Comp.). See 31 C.F.R. § 515 et seq. (1970).
29. A total of 8,404 claims have been submitted totalling $3,339,000.000. Sutton, American
Claims Against Cuba, 3 INT. LAw. 741,742 (1969).
30. 431 F.2d at 402.
31. 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968). See note 17 supra and
accompanying text.
32. Note, Act of State, I I HARV. INT. L.J. 212,227 (1970).
33. See Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 175, 184-85 (1967).
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American investor of the potential recovery of his property.
Moreover, to intervene in only selected cases prompts charges of
discrimination against the United States and, of course, invites
retaliation of the same nature." Finally, the decision illustrates the
lack of foresight demonstrated by Congress in its haste to chastise the
Castro government by offering piecemeal redress in the courts at the
expense of concentrated efforts by the Executive. The Amendment
itself rests on the erroneous assumption by Congress that other
national courts have generally voided the act of state doctrine when
necessary.3 5 Furthermore, as the First National City decision
establishes, the Amendment reaches only property which the
expropriator attempts to market in the United States; it in no way
prohibits such trade but rather threatens only a potential lawsuit if the
property is identified. The latter problem is especially vexing when it
is noted that most property recently nationalized has been either non-
identifiable raw material or non-marketable property.3 6 The
confiscating nation is forewarned only that it need seek non-American
markets for resale; the investor's "day in court" is thus denied him by
the very effect of the Amendment, providing, as it does, a remedy only
as to a very limited class of property, itself excluded by the imposition
of the Cuban trade embargo by Presidential proclamation in 1962. 37
Conceivably, the foresightedness of decisions such as those rendered
in French and First National City will guide the Congress to more
practical solutions to protect American investment abroad.
34. See generally Mazaroff, An Evaluation of the Sabbatino Amendment as a Legislative
Guardian of American Investment Abroad, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 788 (1969).
35. ENlot one case of all those cited is authority for the proposition that any independent
nation in the world has ever eliminated from its jurisprudence the principle of law
embraced in the act of state doctrine, permitted its courts to ignore it, or made any
exception to it. Reeves, The Sabbatino Case and the Sabbatino Amendment:
Comedy-or Tragedy--of Errors, 20 VAND. L. REv. 429,487 (1967).
36. For recent discussions of ramifications of the problem, see generally Benham, In Latin
America: Growing Threats to U.S. Companies, U.S. NEws, July 14, 1969, at 68-70; Clear,
Report from Lima, FORT NE, Mar., 1969 at 55-56; BusiNEss WEEK, Nov. 22, 1969, at 80-82;
NATiONAL REVIEW, Sept. 9, 1969, at 891-92; U.S. NEws, Nov. 3, 1969, at 55-56.
37. See note 28 supra.
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